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Abstract 
Since there is a professionalization trend (Wilensky, 1964), professional associations are one of the few 
cases of associations which membership is not in decline, namely according to the World Values Survey 
data from 2000s. Most professions need to be organized as associations to be able to exert influence 
over the political power and this influence becomes more important when the State attributes 
autonomy to these associations in order to regulate the profession and defend the public interest. These 
professional groups thus acquire a privileged relation with the State (Halliday, 1987).  
In Portugal, these professional associations are named professional public associations (PPAs), also 
known as professional Orders. These PPAs are entities of the indirect and autonomous administration of 
the State (Moreira, 2003). The system of professional regulation in Portugal belongs to the most 
common pattern of the European Continent, in which the professional associations have the monopoly 
of professional regulation (Moran and Wood, 2003).  
The ambiguity of interests defended, private or public, is a characteristic of these associations (Candler, 
2000; Moreira, 2003). Therefore, many times, when contributing towards the control of work, of the 
market, etc., these professional associations are responsible for the collision of public interest with 
professional interest. In this sense, in our country, some PPAs were involved in polemic situations when 
they obstructed the adhesion of professionals whose graduation course was not recognized by the PPA, 
but had been homologated by the Government (Lusa, 2005).  
We can say that behind a professional association there is always a candidate to a PPA (Moreira, 2003). 
In this sense, some Portuguese associations entitle themselves association pro-Order, like the Pro-Order 
Association of Psychologists (Associação Pró-Ordem dos Psicólogos) and the Teachers Pro-Order Trade 
Union (Associação Sindical dos Professores Pró-ordem). Professional associations can, with effect, also 
be understood as a strategy of a group to strengthen its status (Selander in Burrage and Torstendahl, 
1990).  
Recently we have observed a substantial increase in the number of professional groups that obtain the 
status of a PPA following an apparently discretionary criterion by the legislator (Rego in Freire, 2004). 
For instance some professional groups succeeded to obtain the public status, like economists, while 
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others, even if acting in more public interest sensitive fields, took longer, like psychologists or 
nutritionists.  
As a result of the proliferation of PPAs, Law 6/2008 was recently published to regulate its creation and 
action. The law has established a formal procedure for all PPAs creation but did not bring new features 
in terms of these associations power, namely on professional regulation. The only new requirement for 
the creation of a PPA is the making of a previous study, apparently an indicative of the importance of 
technical and scientific nature of the PPA creation. In short, we may expect that the material resources 
of professional groups will be important in order to support the legal initiative, besides the change of 
their lobbying focus, which will be centred on the parliamentary political parties instead of the 
government. 
The aim of this paper is to present and analyse the before and after periods of recently developed 
Portuguese legislation designed to regulate professional associations, taking in account policy makers 
standpoints, namely parliamentary parties who have voted and enacted the Law 6/2008. This paper is 
the result of an ongoing project on professional associations’ creation and it intends to discuss the 
impact of the new legal framework on the future strategies of professional groups. 
 




Ever since the classical work of Carr-Saunders and Wilson in 1933, on the sociology of professions, 
professional associations have been referred only in a secondary way. And despite literature making 
reference to the great power of professional associations (Halliday, 1987), research on them is scarce 
(Van Hoy, 1993; Greenwood et al., 2002), especially research on the process that leads to the creation of 
professional associations. 
Most professions need to be organised as associations to be able to exert influence over the political 
power. This influence becomes more important when the State gives to these associations the 
autonomy to regulate the profession and defend the public interest. These professional groups thus 
acquire a privileged relation with the State (Halliday, 1987). 
In this sense, professional associations have been considered as the most influent associations in 
Portugal (Freire, 2004). They are consulted on legislative issues and also take initiative to pronounce 
themselves on professional matters, which include the creation of other professional associations. This 
means that when a professional group intends to influence political decision-making in order to have 
self-regulation power, it must not only persuade decision-makers, but also deal with already existent 
professional associations that will be lobbying in the reverse direction.  
This paper presents an ongoing research on the influence of professional groups, organised in voluntary 
associations, on the creation of professional associations. In this communication, we aim to highlight 





There are three main parts in this paper:  
i) first of all, we make a brief reference to the increase of power of professional associations 
and to the diversity of professional regulation systems in order to contextualise our 
research;  
ii) secondly, we introduce the Portuguese case focusing on the recent discretionary trend to 
create professional associations and the consequent emergence of Law 6/2008 in order to 
control it, summarising its content; 
iii) finally, we highlight current political positions, and present the effects of the new legal 
framework that are already evident. 
 
1. Professional associations’ power increase and the European Continent pattern of regulation 
Since there is a professionalization of everyone (Wilensky, 1964), it is expected that the number of 
members of professional associations will increase. Robert D. Putnam (2000) has observed that 
professional associations’ membership was exceptionally growing in the United States, in a time of civic 
participation collapse. World Values Survey findings also showed that professional associations’ 
membership is growing in several countries, as we may see in Graph 1.  
Graph 1: Evolution of professional associations’ membership (1990; 1999; 2006) - % 
 
Source: World Values Survey  
(Japan‘s data is from 2005 and not from 2006; there is no data available for Portugal in 2006). 
 
Professional associations are increasing their power, not only because their representativeness is 
growing, but also because, as Julia Evetts (2002) stresses, professions are themselves internationalising, 
leading to the reinforcement of international professional associations. 
In this sense, more professional groups show the ambition to have professional regulating power. And 
most of them need to be organised as associations to be able to exert influence over the political power, 
as Terence C. Halliday (1987) has sustained. This influence becomes more important when the State 
gives to these associations the autonomy to regulate the profession and defend the public interest. 

















In Portugal, these professional associations are named professional public associations (PPAs), also 
known as professional Orders (Ordens profissionais). These PPAs are part of the autonomous branch of 
the State (Moreira, 2003). The system of professional regulation in Portugal belongs to the most 
common pattern of the European Continent, in which the professional associations have the monopoly 
of the professional regulation. Table 1 shows us the main regulation systems. 
Table 1: Regulation system patterns and their agencies 
REGULATION SYSTEMS REGULATORY AGENCIES DOMINANT REGION 
Independent self-regulation (monopolist) Professional associations European continent 
State sanctioned self-regulation Professional associations Anglo-Saxon countries 
Direct state regulation State -- 
Source: adapted from Moran and Wood, 1993. 
But, as Moran and Wood stress “There is no ‘model’ of regulation – and the pattern in any one country is 
certainly not the only model.” (1993: 19). In this sense, in Portugal, there are at the same time the 
administrative regulation system, namely for taxi drivers, hair dressers, etc., and a kind of independent 
system for journalists who count on a regulating council composed by experts, professionals and other 
members. 
2. Portuguese professional associations discretionary increase and Law 6/2008 
The type of professional associations with the monopoly of regulation of the profession are considered 
one of the most powerful associations in democracy, although we do not know much about the process 
of their creation, nor of their effective impact, namely in professionals.  
The ambiguity of interests defended, private or public, is a characteristic of professional associations 
(Candler, 2000) and in particular of PPA (Moreira, 2003). Therefore, when contributing towards the 
control of work, of the market, etc., these professional associations are responsible for the collision of 
the public interest with the professional interest. In this sense, in Portugal, some PPAs, and architects in 
particular, were involved in polemic situations when they obstructed the adhesion of professionals 
whose graduation course was not recognized by the PPA, but had been homologated by the 
Government (Lusa, 2005).  
We can say that behind a professional association there is always a candidate to a PPA (Moreira, 2003). 
In fact, some voluntary associations of private law pursue this goal and inscribe it in its own name. Some 
Portuguese associations entitle themselves association pro-Order, like the Pro-Order Association of 
Psychologists (Associação Pró-Ordem dos Psicólogos) and the Teachers Pro-Order Trade Union 
(Associação Sindical dos Professores Pró-ordem). Professional associations can, with effect, also be 
understood as a strategy of a group to strengthen its own status (Selander in Burrage and Torstendahl, 
1990).  
Recently we have observed a substantial increase in the number of PPAs that obtain the status of a PPA 
following an apparently discretionary criterion by the legislator (Rego in Freire, 2004). In fact, some 
professional groups succeeded to obtain the public status of a PPA, such as economists, while others did 
not, even if acting in more public interest sensitive fields, like psychologist or nutritionists. As an 
interviewee of a political party told us, the creation of a PPA was dependent of the political moment. 
This presumes, of course, that first of all there was lobbying of a professional group close to the 
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government. The proximity of social ties between the government and the professional group appears 
then to us as a plausible hypothesis to explain the PPA creation.   
Table 2 shows us the creation of Portuguese PPAs in the democratic period. We observe that 10 out of 
17 current PPAs (which also includes lawyers, physicians, solicitors, pharmacists, engineers, dispatchers, 
accounting auditors), were created after the 25th April 1974, and especially in the 1990s. 

















































































































































Source: Based on Rego in Freire, 2004. 
As a result of the proliferation of PPAs, Law 6/2008 was published in February 2008 to regulate its 
creation. New PPAs must follow this legal framework and already existent PPAs may ask to be integrated 
in the new regime. All political parties represented in the Parliament have agreed with Law 6/2008 since 
it intends to clarify and increase transparency to the process of professional groups lobbying.  
This Law institutionalise the traditional tacit criteria for PPAs creation, namely: 
- its exceptional character, resulting of a special public interest need;  
- the exclusive nomination of Ordem (or Câmara if concerning a not  graduated profession) to 
these associations, and bastonário for their presidents - preventing appropriation from others as 
it has happened with Ordem dos Avaliadores (building auditors), which is in fact a private 
association; 
- the defence of users and professionals interests at the same time; 
- the equivalence of PPAs as public institutions concerning their legal regime (for example 
statutes must be created and changed by the Parliament) and its administrative and financial 
autonomy -which implies the interdiction of participation in trade union actions and issues; 
- the monopoly of representation and the control of individuals admitted to the profession; 
- the right to be consulted in legal issues regarding the profession;  
- the existence of an autonomous disciplinary control.  
The new legal framework has established a formal procedure for all PPAs creation but did not bring 
many new features concerning the professional regulation. The Law has determined that any rights 










Clerks Psychologists Accountants 
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Government are not recognised by the respective PPA. Some other features were also clarified by the 
Law: 
- the interdiction of numerus clausus on access to the profession; 
- the settlement of the responsible ministry, besides an annual report to be sent to the Parliament and 
to the Government about the PPA performance; 
- the right to impose at least a registration of all members, although the statutes can assume a different 
orientation; 
- the determination of the right to create private associations; 
- the limitation of social bodies to two mandates, and each one to four years at the maximum; 
- the distinction between professionals and members sanctions, since the non payment of PPAs quota 
cannot justify a member exclusion, which is the hardest sanction; 
- the initiative of a disciplinary process may be raised by PPAs social bodies but also by the users’ 
defender (provedor), always a non member, or by the public ministry; 
- the regime of interest incompatibilities between social bodies members and also between social 
bodies members and public functions - although exceptions are accepted.  
But probably the most important features are, on one side, the fact that the creation of a PPA is now 
especially a Parliament initiative, not a Government proposal. This changes the focus of professional 
groups lobbying into different parties, increasing the channels available to make pressure, but it also 
leads to a longer process. And, on the other side, the need of a prior study in order to demonstrate the 
special public interest need of self-regulation, which is a controversial feature.  
The elaboration of a prior study apparently is an indicative of the importance of technical and scientific 
nature of the PPA creation. The study contents required are not precise, which means that the study 
may include whatever the authors consider relevant. It even allows that the study does not propose 
exactly the same thing the professional group does. Some studies seem to include a legal opinion, a 
draft of the PPA bylaw, besides a more or less sociological study on the professionals (number, training 
courses, certification,...). The payer of the study is also not mentioned. The lack of information on this 
has leaded at least one professional group to develop a fund campaign.  
We may expect that, on one side, studies can be of diverse nature, risking the lack of adequate 
information to support the decision making, and surely not providing comparable data. On the other 
side, only groups with resources, or who succeed to get the money to pay an independent and 
prestigious institution, may initiate the process which is a contribution to inequity and not to the public 
interest.  
These two aspects tend to be particularly problematic taking into account that there are other 
professionals who may be implicated in the field, with less material resources and/or with less 
representation power. In fact, this situation seems to be promoted by the current period of Bologna 
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Declaration implementation in which we find co-workers with different curricula: some recognised by 
Bologna’s, others not. 
3. Policy makers standpoints and the impact of the new legal framework on professional groups 
As said before, professional associations can be understood as a strategy of a group to strengthen its 
status (Selander in Burrage and Torstendahl, 1990) and, in this sense, we can analyze professional 
groups as pressure groups.  
We cannot speak of a general theory, nor even of a pattern per country (Thomas, 2001), but frequently, 
professional groups tend to follow a pattern of cooperation or pragmatic involvement (Thomas, 2001), 
for example with political parties who support them.  Several factors constraint the relation established 
between a pressure group and a political party: the political and socio-economic development of the 
country; the normative and political framework (degree of centralisation of the government, strength of 
political parties, etc.); the characteristics of the pressure group (leadership, objectives, strategies, etc.) 
(Thomas, 2001). On the other hand, the group-party relation is expressed in different ways, as in 
overlapping membership, ideological affinities, among others (Thomas, 2001).  
The question of why some pressure groups are more influent than others seems to be fundamental for 
the understanding of democracy; however, it remains unanswered (Binderkrantz, 2008). Some 
explanations have pointed to the resources available and the different strategies used (internal and 
external), or the diversity of used channels (Binderkrantz, 2008). However, these explanations have 
limitations in their empirical measurement and do not seem to explain, for instance, the choice of whom 
to influence.  
Before the regulating law, it was expected that the influence would occur in a more fruitful way if 
professionals had access to Government members. With law 6/2008, the opportunities to influence are 
bigger since they must be addressed to parliamentary parties (although the minister in charge of the 
professional field is informally contacted by the Parliament to give his opinion as well) but success can 
take longer since it involves more actors.  
If there is a Parliament majority, we could expect that the main focus of the influence would be the 
party in Government. But when there is not a majority, professional groups often request audiences to 
all parties with parliamentary representation and in particular to those represented in the parliamentary 
commission in charge of the PPAs creation - small parties do not have human resources to participate in 
all parliamentary commissions. In this sense, we have already seen different political parties taking the 
initiative to present a PPA proposal, such as in the case of psychologists.  
In the Portuguese spectrum there are two parties particularly active in this matter, the Socialist and the 
Christian Democratic parties. These proposals seem to be related with parties’ resources, but also with 
their priorities. In fact, left-wing parties consider that the agenda of the parliamentary commission must 
give more space for discussing the Labour Code or eventual redundancy cases, for example.  
In any case, when asked about the need of self-regulating professional associations political parties 
represented in Parliament do not seem to have a mature thought on the subject with few exceptions.  
Table 3 presents us a sum of the opinions of the Portuguese parliamentary political parties on the need 








The need of self-regulating professional 
associations 
Propositions on the 
regulation of self-regulating 
system 
PS (socialist) Yes, if according to the law - the State must 
review its functions 
Has made a proposition 
PSD (social democrat) Yes, according to the public interest No propositions 
CDS (Christian dem.) Yes, always even if we should not banalize it Has made a proposition 
BE (left) Not necessary – it is not universal and it 
often plays a corporatist role 
No propositions 
PCP (communist) Yes, in principle No propositions 
Os Verdes (green) No position, but not against if democratic  No propositions  
 
In the near future we expect to observe the expansion of professional groups lobbying. For now, based 
on the formal demands of audiences and considering the public expression of that goal (in newspapers, 
in websites), there are at least nine professional groups currently intending to become a PPA. The 
process has started more than 10 years ago in some cases. The next table identifies these groups. 
 
Table 4: Professional groups intending to create a PPA (May 2010) 
 Professional groups Current situation 
1 Archaeologists A platform of two associations leads the discussion process inside the 
professional group and has found receptivity from the supervising 
ministry 
2 Designers Law projects are in discussion at the Parliament 
3 Health technicians  A platform of associations leads the influence process for a global self-
regulation association 
4 Landscape architects A study is being developed in order to fulfil the legal requirement 
5 Nutrionists  The professional PPA was approved in general by the Parliament and is 
now waiting for the specialised discussion – although dieticians are 
contesting, because they want to be included 
6 Physiotherapists A petition presented at a parliamentary commission was rejected since 
there was no new data on the demand process 
7 Teachers A study was made; the process seems to be currently lead by the 
national teacher associations but there is also a pro-Order association 
8 Social Workers Auditions with members were made focusing on the legal proposition 
and on the study that will be presented to the Parliament 
9 Urbanism professionals Audiences were asked during the previous legislature – similar 
organisations were contacted abroad – and the architects Order has 
created in 2004 the urbanism council which was implemented in 2008…  
Similar associations in other countries were contacted in some cases, namely the social workers and the 
urbanism professionals. National associations carrying this influence process also know each other and 
seem to cooperate, even if we do not have systematic information on this. 
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One important consequence of the political influence process is the scissions it causes inside the field:  
(a) among professionals who disagree about the PPA creation or about the form it takes;  
(b) among professionals  with the same function but different backgrounds;  
(c) among professionals with different functions but working together.  
Besides, these divisions usually correspond to splits within and between professional associations:  
A) between professionals from the same association,  
B) between different associations of the professional field (Law 6/2008 establishes the obligation 
of their consultation during the PPA creation), and  
C) among different professional fields, which can be particularly difficult if there is already a PPA 
since it can take advantage of its privileged position next to the state and use more important 
resources. This situation leads sometimes to lawsuits. The leading association will often not only 
intend that a PPA is created, but also to become itself that PPA. And this is clear in particular 
when the president becomes the PPA president, the bastonário. 
But empirical data still needs to be gathered in order to demonstrate this and to continue our research.  
Conclusion 
In this paper an attempt is made to contribute to the knowledge of professional groups’ political 
influence on the creation of self-regulating professional associations. Professional associations are one 
of the most important associations in democracy and in particular in Portugal where they are apparently 
often present in mass media.  
We have emphasised the recent discretionary creation of PPAs in Portugal and the consequent essay to 
stop it. Law 6/2008 came to coercively regulate self-regulating professional associations. It has made 
more explicit the set of traditionally tacit criteria, has clarified PPAs’ capacities in order to avoid new 
problems of legitimacy dispute between institutions, and has imposed a prior study to support the need 
to create a new PPA next to the parliamentary political parties. 
In sum, there are three main changes in the legal framework. First of all, apparently more professional 
groups intend to reach the PPA status and have initiated the respective study request; the study 
requisite has generated different kinds of contents since they are not stipulated by law, which leads us 
to sustain the need for standard parameters, in order to assure a more rigorous and transparent 
decision-making; finally, this law has imposed a transfer of decision-making focus from the Government 
to the Parliament, and consequently the change of the professional groups target in the lobbying 
process. Apparently the access to the political decision-making is easier but the process may take longer 
and is limited to professional groups with resources instead of based in their relevance to the public 
interest. 
This paper is the result of our exploratory field work. We are now particularly interested in analysing 
other countries’ experiences, and then to focus our attention in a case study. Meanwhile, we welcome 
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